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Abstract. We investigate robustness of correlated networks against propagating attacks modeled by a
susceptible-infected-removed model. By Monte-Carlo simulations, we numerically determine the first crit-
ical infection rate, above which a global outbreak of disease occurs, and the second critical infection rate,
above which disease disintegrates the network. Our result shows that correlated networks are robust com-
pared to the uncorrelated ones, regardless of whether they are assortative or disassortative, when a fraction
of infected nodes in an initial state is not too large. For large initial fraction, disassortative network be-
comes fragile while assortative network holds robustness. This behavior is related to the layered network
structure inevitably generated by a rewiring procedure we adopt to realize correlated networks.
PACS. XX.XX.XX No PACS code given
1 Introduction
One of the most important properties of complex net-
works, such as the WWW, the Internet, social and biolog-
ical networks, is robustness against failures or intentional
attacks [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Albert et al. numerically studied
the robustness of networks against random failure, where
nodes are sequentially removed with equal probability, and
intentional attack, where hubs (nodes with large degrees)
are preferentially removed [7]. When a network has the
scale-free (SF) degree distribution pk ∝ k
−γ , where k is
degree and pk is the fraction of nodes with degree k, the
network having γ ≤ 3 is highly robust against the random
failure: you have to remove almost all nodes to disinte-
grate the network. However, SF networks are fragile to
the intentional attack: the network is destroyed if a small
fraction of hubs are removed. Later, this observation has
been analytically supported [8,9,10]. The robustness of
networks against other percolation-like processes such as
the betweenness-based attack [11] and degree-weighted at-
tacks [12] have also been studied.
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Other attacks to networks may occur as propagating
processes such as computer viruses do [13,14,15]. Let
us consider the susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model
with infection rate λ (and recovery rate µ = 1) on a net-
work. The system has, in general, two critical infection
rates λc1 and λc2 [16,17]. Above the first critical infec-
tion rate λc1, a global outbreak of disease occurs. In a
global outbreak, a fraction of the nodes become infected
and eventually removed. The remaining network of suscep-
tible nodes, however, may survive as a giant component
up to the second critical infection rate λc2, above which
the network is finally disintegrated. Thus we here adopt
λc2 as a measure of robustness against propagating at-
tacks [17]. Note that λc2 is in principle equal to or larger
than λc1.
In [18], the first critical infection rate λc1 is approxi-
mately derived. In particular, any positive infection rate
induces a global outbreak in SF networks having γ ≤ 3,
meaning λc1 = 0. Newman studied the SIR model on un-
correlated networks in terms of transmissibility to show
that λc2 > 0 even for γ ≤ 3 [16]. Hasegawa and Masuda
extended his analysis to evaluate the robustness λc2 in
some vaccinated networks [17].
Real networks often have some degree correlations [19,
20]. A network is said to be assortative when nodes with
similar degrees tend to connect with each other. A network
is called disassortative when nodes with high degrees tend
to connect to nodes with low degrees. Empirical data in-
dicates that social networks are likely to be assortative,
while technological networks and biological networks to
be disassortative [19,20,2]. Degree correlations affect dy-
namics on networks. Previous studies have reported the
effects of the degree correlations on various dynamics,
e.g., percolation [21,22], target attack [23,24], Ising model
[25], susceptible-infected-susceptible model [26], informa-
tion spreading [27], etc. As for the SIR model, Vazquez
and Moreno showed that the increase of the assortativity
makes easier to induce a global outbreak [28]. However,
we do not know the effect of the degree correlation of net-
works on the robustness against such propagating attack
modeled by the SIR model.
In this paper, we perform a Monte-Carlo simulation for
the SIR model on networks having a degree correlation.
We numerically determine λc1 and λc2 to show that cor-
related network is robust compared to the uncorrelated
one regardless of whether it is assortative or disassorta-
tive, when a fraction of infected nodes in an initial state
is not too large. For large initial fraction, disassortative
network becomes fragile while assortative network holds
robustness. This behavior is related to the layered network
structure inevitably generated by a rewiring procedure we
adopt to realize correlated networks [25,29].
2 Model
We consider the SIR model on a given network with N
nodes. Each node takes one of the three states: suscep-
tible, infected, or removed. A fraction pseed of the nodes
are initially infected and other nodes are susceptible. Sus-
ceptible nodes get infected at a rate proportional to the
number of infected neighbors: the susceptible node gets in-
Takehisa Hasegawa et al.: Robustness of correlated networks against propagating attacks 3
fected with probability λ∆t within a short time ∆t when
it is adjacent to an infected node. An infected node be-
comes removed, irrespective of the neighbors’ states, at a
unit rate µ = 1, i.e., with probability ∆t within short time
∆t.
In the final state, each node takes either susceptible or
removed state. We call the connected components of re-
moved nodes and susceptible nodes the infected networks
and the residual networks, respectively. Then, the critical
infection rates λc1 and λc2 are given in terms of percola-
tion transition. We define Rmax(N) and Smax(N) to be the
mean largest component sizes of the infected networks and
residual networks, respectively. Noting that an infection
quickly dies out (spreads globally) for λ < λc1(> λc1) and
the residual networks include a giant component (consist
of only finite components) for λ < λc2(> λc2), we expect
that Rmax(N) and Smax(N) behave as
{Rmax, Smax} ∝
{{const., N} (λ < λc1)
{N,N} (λc1 < λ < λc2)
{N, const.} (λ > λc2)
. (1)
In the following sections, we perform Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations for the SIR model on the uncorrelated and cor-
related networks. Here we adopt the following degree dis-
tributions: an exponential degree distribution,
pk =
1
3
(
2
3
)k−2
, (2)
and a SF degree distribution with γ = 3,
pk =
12
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
∝ k−3. (3)
Note that those networks have the same average degree
〈k〉 = 4.
An uncorrelated network having the above distribu-
tions can be generated by the configuration model [2].
The network so obtained is then randomly rewired so as
to have a correlation without changing the degree distri-
bution. We adopt the following scheme proposed in [25,
29]: (a) Select randomly two edges and look up the de-
grees of four nodes linked by these edges. (b) Rewire the
two edges, with probability prewire, in a way that one edge
links two nodes having the higher degrees and the other
links the remaining two nodes, and otherwise rewire them
randomly. (c) Repeat (a) and (b) until the degree corre-
lation (see below) reaches a stationary value. To generate
a disassortative network, we replace the step (b) with the
following step: (b)′ Rewire the two edges, with probability
prewire, in a way that one edge links two nodes having the
highest and lowest degrees and the other links the remain-
ing two nodes, and otherwise rewire them randomly.
Here we adopt the following quantity for a measure of
the degree correlation [29]:
A =
∑
k Ekk −
∑
k E
r
kk
1−
∑
k E
r
kk
, (4)
where Ekk is the probability that both ends of a randomly
chosen edge have degree k, and Erkk is that of the uncorre-
lated networks (with the same degree distribution). Uncor-
related networks take A = 0, and a network is regarded
as assortative (disassortative) when A > 0(< 0). After
the above process, the mean value of A takes a prewire-
dependent value. Choosing prewire appropriately, we have
a network with a desirable degree correlation.
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Fig. 1. Results for uncorrelated networks with an exponen-
tial degree distribution: (a) order parameters Rmax(N)/N and
Smax(N)/N , (b) fractal exponents ψS(N) and ψR(N), (c) scal-
ing plot of Rmax(N) and (d) scaling plot of Smax(N). The num-
ber of nodes N is 2048 (red-circle), 4096 (green-triangle), 8192
(blue-diamond), and 16384 (purple-square). The full and open
symbols denote the results for the residual and infected net-
works, respectively.
3 Result: Uncorrelated Case
In this section, we show the results of Monte-Carlo simu-
lations for the SIR model on uncorrelated networks. The
number of graph realizations is 500 and the number of SIR
runs on each realization is 100. The number of nodes is
taken from N = 29 to 214.
First, we consider uncorrelated networks with the ex-
ponential degree distribution (2). The order parameters
Rmax(N)/N and Smax(N)/N with several network sizes
are shown in Fig. 1(a). Here we set pseed = 0.1. As the
infection rate λ increases, Rmax(N)/N monotonically in-
creases while Smax(N)/N monotonically decreases.
To determine the critical points, we introduce the frac-
tal exponents ψR and ψS of the infected and residual net-
works defined by [30,31]
Smax(N) ∝ N
ψS , Rmax(N) ∝ N
ψR , (5)
respectively. Noting that Eq.(1), we expect
{ψR, ψS} ∝
{
{0, 1} (λ < λc1)
{ψR,c, 1} (λ = λc1)
{1, 1} (λc1 < λ < λc2)
{1, ψS,c} (λ = λc2)
{1, 0} (λ > λc2)
. (6)
For numerical computations, we evaluate the effective ex-
ponents of finite N :
ψS(N) =
d logSmax(N)
d logN
, ψR(N) =
d logRmax(N)
d logN
.(7)
Then, ψR(N) and ψS(N) with several sizes cross at λ =
λc1 and λ = λc2, respectively.
By using data of Fig. 1(a), we plot the effective fractal
exponent in Fig. 1(b). We have a crossing point of ψR(N)
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at λc1 ≈ 0.05, and of ψS(N) at λc2 ≈ 0.72. At the crossing
points, the corresponding fractal exponents take the same
value ψR,c = ψS,c = 2/3. The property that the largest
component size at criticality is proportional to N2/3 is
also observed in the mean field SIR model [32,33] and
percolation of the random graph [34].
We further determine the critical exponent by using a
finite size scaling. For Rmax(N), we assume the following
scaling form [31]:
Rmax(N) = N
ψR,cf [N(∆λ)β/(1−ψR,c)] , (8)
where f(x) is a scaling function satisfying
f(x) =
{
x1−ψR,c for x≫ 1
const for x≪ 1
, (9)
∆λ = λ − λc1, and β is the critical exponent of the or-
der parameter, Rmax(N)/N ∝ |∆λ|
β . The scaling form
for Smax(N) is assumed in a similar way. Our scaling re-
sults for Rmax(N) and Smax(N) are shown in Figs. 1(c)
and (d). For both plots, the fitting parameter β is taken
as β = 1. This indicates that these transitions are in the
mean field universality class. Similar scalings for the mean
cluster sizes of the residual and infected networks are also
assumed in a similar way [31]. We have a good data col-
lapse for both by setting β = 1 (not shown).
The results for the SF network are shown in Fig.2. As
N increases, ψR(N) near λ = 0 approaches one, indicating
that λc1 = 0 for SF networks with γ = 3 [18]. On the other
hand, ψS(N) with several sizes cross at λc2 ≈ 0.56, which
is smaller than that of the exponential distribution. This
is consistent with the fact that the SF network with γ = 3
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Fig. 2. Results for uncorrelated SF networks: (a) order pa-
rameters Rmax(N)/N and Smax(N)/N , (b) fractal exponents
ψS(N) and ψR(N), and (c) scaling plot of Smax(N). The num-
ber of nodes N is 2048 (red-circle), 4096 (green-triangle), 8192
(blue-diamond), and 16384 (purple-square). The full and open
symbols denote the results for the residual and infected net-
works, respectively.
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is fragile compared to the random graph with the same
average degree [17]. The same analysis is performed with
several initial seed fractions pseed = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. Our simu-
lations indicate that the SF network remains fragile in this
range of pseed. In Fig.2(c), our scaling result shows that the
transition of residual networks belongs to the mean field
universality class, β = 1, even when the network is scale-
free with γ = 3. Here we assumed ψS,c = 2/3. Although
our numerical data (Fig.2(b)) seems to be less precise due
to small samples, we performed a similar analysis for a
dynamic percolation in the same universality as the SIR
model to show precisely ψS,c = 2/3 for that model (not
shown).
4 Result: Correlated Case
We performed similar simulations on correlated networks
with several degree correlation A. Here A takes a value in
a range [−0.1, 0.5].
The critical infection rates λc1 and λc2 of the net-
work with the exponential degree distribution are plotted
as a function of A (Fig.3). As expected in [28], λc1 de-
creases when A increases (Fig.3(a)). On the other hand,
we observe a nontrivial behavior for λc2 (Fig.3(b)). For
pseed = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, the uncorrelated network is most frag-
ile: λc2 increases when the network is correlated, regard-
less of whether it is assortative or disassortative. This ten-
dency decreases with the increase of pseed, and we did not
observe such a behavior for pseed = 0.7. There, a disassor-
tative network is fragile than the uncorrelated one. Figure
4 is the result for SF network. We can observe a similar
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Fig. 3. (a) λc1 and (b) λc2 of the correlated network with
an exponential degree distribution as a function of degree
correlation A. The initial seed fraction pseed is set to 0.1
(red-circle), 0.3 (green-triangle), 0.5 (blue-diamond), and 0.7
(purple-square).
dependence of λc2 on A. Our scaling results indicate that
ψS,c (and β) tends to decrease (increase) with the increase
of the assortativity, although it was hard for our simula-
tion to determine precise values because of large error-bars
(not shown). More extensive simulation or another effec-
tive method should be performed for the evaluation of the
critical properties in detail.
The above behavior of λc2 is due to the layered network
structure of correlated networks [25]. In Fig. 5, we profile
the adjacency matrix of SF network for severalA. Assorta-
tive networks consist of monolayers of nodes where nodes
with similar degrees are connected to each other, while dis-
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Fig. 4. λc2 of the correlated network with the SF degree
distribution as a function of degree correlation A. The initial
seed fraction pseed is set to 0.1 (red-circle), 0.3 (green-triangle),
0.5 (blue-diamond), and 0.7 (purple-square).
assortative networks consist of bilayers where nodes with
the low-degree side are connected to a range of high-degree
nodes. For such a layered structure, there are few edges
between different layers.
Our propagating attack consists of two elements: the
random initial failure realized by pseed and the SIR dy-
namics starting from infected nodes. When the SIR dy-
namics starts from a single infected node, the outbreak
from the node, local or global, is likely to be confined in
the layer containing the node and all other layers will re-
main as the giant component after the attack. Therefore,
correlated networks, assortative or disassortative, are ro-
bust compared to uncorrelated ones for small pseed. For
large pseed, on the other hand, the initial failure damages
a number of susceptive nodes and the remaining network
becomes marginally percolating at the beginning. In this
situation the more assortative (disassortative) is the cor-
relation, the more robust (fragile) is the network against
the random failure, just as seen in the percolation on cor-
related networks [28].
5 Summary
We have investigated the robustness of correlated net-
works against a propagating attack modeled by the SIR
model. Our numerical results show that correlated net-
works are robust compared to the uncorrelated ones, re-
gardless of whether they are assortative or disassortative
when a fraction of infected nodes in an initial state is not
too large. This behavior is related to the layered struc-
ture of our correlated networks. For large pseed, disassor-
tative network becomes fragile. Note that the layered net-
work structure is not an intrinsic property of correlated
networks (e.g., we can construct a disassortative network
having almost no layered structure [22]). It remains open
for future works to search a mechanism of strengthening
the robustness of real correlated networks against propa-
gating attacks.
Previous studies for epidemics on complex networks
have mainly focused on the (first) critical infection rate
λc1, above which a global outbreak occurs. Instead, we
have focused on the second critical infection rate λc2 in
this paper. In particular, it is important when we con-
sider epidemics on community networks, where we should
distinguish local epidemics, i.e., an outbreak confined in
a single community, and global epidemics, i.e., epidemic
spreading through the whole communities [35]. We expect
that the robustness against propagating attacks will be a
good measure for searching effective vaccines in commu-
nity networks.
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. The ordered adjacency matrix A of a SF network with (a) A ≃ −0.1, (b) A ≃ 0, and (c) A ≃ 0.8. The number of
nodes is N = 1000. The matrices have N × N entries Aij , where Aij = 1 (black) if nodes i and j are connected and Aij = 0
(white) otherwise. The nodes are arranged in the order of increasing degree.
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